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SESSION ONE THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS
Session One of the Paris Colloquium on Corporate Governance focused on
the evolving role of the board of directors in the business corporation. The role
of the board of directors has been a topic of extensive commentary and debate
in recent years. The topic divides into a number of interrelated subissues.
First, the way in which a jurisdiction defines the purposes of the business
corporation determines the constituencies which a board of directors must
represent. A number of different constituencies could be considered significant
enough to require board representation, including shareholders, employees,
consumers, the general public, and environmental groups. Countries have not
defined corporate purposes uniformly. In the United States, for example, it is
assumed that the corporation is owned by the shareholders and that the
fundamental corporate purpose, with some exceptions, is to maximize long-term
profitability. In Germany, however, the principle of co-determination mandates
that the interests of employees as well as shareholders be accommodated.
The second subissue is the role of nonmanagement or "outside" directors:
members of the board who do not have a significant relationship with the
full-time senior executives of the corporation. Outside directors have drawn
increasing support as a means for the board to fulfill its responsibilities to all
constituencies represented on the board.
The third critical subissue concerns the role of the board of directors in
corporate governance. A board of directors may be a mere "rubber stamp" for
management decisions, may actively manage the corporation, may render
advice to management, and/or may monitor the performance of management
in reaching corporate objectives. The literature in this area is extensive, with
many commentators advocating that boards adopt a larger "monitoring" role.
In reality, however, boards assume widely divergent roles depending upon such
factors as the relevant country, legal structure, corporate culture, age and size
of the corporation, and the extent of the public distribution of corporate stock.
The final subissue relates to the general structure of the board. Some
corporations use a unitary or single-tier board structure, while others have
adopted a two-tier board structure with a "management" board and a "super-
visory" board. Additionally, corporations have used committees as a means of
dividing up board responsibilities. The discussion of board committees is
contained in Session Three of this Colloquium.
Professor Barth616my Mercadal of the International Faculty chaired this
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session of the Colloquium. Dean Robert Mundheim, also a member of the
International Faculty, opened the session by considering the purposes of
business corporations. He then reviewed present-day methods for making
management accountable and found each defective. He explained that the
failure of these methods has focused attention on the board of directors and
particularly on the outside directors as the appropriate means to fulfill a
monitoring function. Dean Mundheim concluded by discussing some of the
elements involved in creating an environment supportive of monitoring within
the corporation.
Professor Friedrich Kilbler, a member of the International Faculty, com-
mented on Dean Mundheim's presentation from the perspective of the German
corporation. He emphasized that an increasing number of countries have
broadened the definition of the corporation's objectives to include not only the
interests of the shareholders but also those of the employees. He also remarked
that the German supervisory board has been successful in ensuring that
managers meet their fiduciary responsibilities.
Mr. Pierre Louis Peaucelle examined the role of the board in the context of
the French corporation, noting that the French Civil Code does not precisely
define the respective powers of the board of directors and the President-Direc-
tor General. Because the law is unclear, the role of the board is determined by
other factors, such as the articles of the corporation and the corporation's size
and financial structure. Mr. Gabriel Mathey then described the experience of a
French company which had shifted to a two-tier board structure, with a
directorate and a supervisory board.
A roundtable discussion of the issues raised by each of the presentations
ensued. Excerpts of this discussion have been included in these proceedings.
Dean Mundheim:
I will address what I conceive to be the major task of this conference, which
is to examine on a comparative basis the principles of corporate governance
and structure for business corporations. Our understanding of these principles
will be increased if we consider for a moment the purposes of business
corporations. It seems to me that a purpose of all business corporations, at
least those located in the countries of the International Faculty, is to produce
goods and services efficiently. Stating the purpose of business corporations in
this manner implies certain approaches to the problem of corporate gover-
nance. Other purposes, such as maintaining a particular level of employment,
may indicate somewhat different approaches.
An underlying assumption of the corporation law in the United States is
that a business corporation is owned by its shareholders and that these
shareholders expect the corporation to maximize its long-term profitability.
This assumption is embodied in the American Law Institute's (ALI) draft of
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the Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure 11]. The ALI is a
prestigious, private U.S. institution comprised of distinguished scholars, judges
and practioners. The purpose of its effort in the corporate governance field is
to examine major areas of the law, restate the governing principles, and suggest
directions for future developments.
Section 2.01 of the Institute's draft of the Principles of Corporate Gover-
nance and Structure assumes that a business corporation is owned by share-
holders who expect the corporation to maximize the enterprise's long-term
profitability [2]. The draft emphasizes long-term rather than short-term profits.
Frequently, corporations find it necessary to absorb a short-term loss in order
to maximize long-term profitability. For example, during the Kennedy years,
when interest rates in the United States were lower than those in Europe and
funds were flowing out of the United States at an unhealthy rate, Standard Oil
of Indiana financed its foreign operations by borrowing overseas at higher
interest rates [3]. It did so in order to forestall public criticism and the
enactment of formal rules restricting the outflow of U.S. funds. In effect, the
company took a short-term loss on the financing in order to retain the freedom
to choose its own method of financing. More recently, United California Bank
assumed the obligations of its failed Swiss subsidiary even though there was no
legal obligation to do so. It absorbed a short-term loss to maintain its
credibility in the international financial markets, in the belief that this action
would preserve the long-term profitability of the bank.
Long-term profitability is a very broad principle, one which allows manage-
ment great flexibility. However, this flexibility does not permit management to
pursue every course of action which it might believe the corporation should in
good conscience take. To free management to make such decisions, section
2.01 of the ALI draft contains three proposed exceptions to the principle of
maximizing long-term profitability.
The first exception requires the corporation to act within the boundaries set
by law to the same extent as a natural person. For example, the corporation
may not bribe a government official in order to secure a lucrative contract. The
second exception permits the corporation to take into account ethical princi-
ples that are generally recognized as relevant to the conduct of business. This
exception, for example, permits separation payments to employees upon the
liquidation of a business even though no such payments had been promised to
the employees. Similarly, a business corporation would be permitted to
terminate a profitable operation in the Union of South Africa because that
country's apartheid policies require a treatmeent of employees that is repug-
nant to management. The third exception would permit the corporation to
devote resources, within reasonable limits, to humanitarian, educational, and
philanthropic purposes.
I believe that section 2.01 of the ALI draft fairly describes corporation law
as it exists in the United States today. Corporation law in the United States
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emphasizes the profit maximization principle, but recognizes that the pursuit
of long-term profits may necessitate short-term losses. In addition, manage-
ment has some leeway to consider factors that do not enhance profitability.
A somewhat different picture emerges for corporations outside the United
States, particularly those in Europe and Brazil. Under German constitutional
law, for example, the principle of Unternehmensinteresse provides a somewhat
broader basis for defining the objectives of the business enterprise. That
concept assumes that there are a number of legitimate interests to be accom-
modated in determining the appropriate corporate action. At a minimum,
these include the shareholders' interest in maximizing wealth and the workers'
interest in good wages, decent working conditions, and job security. Other
interests may also be relevant, such as the interests of the community in which
the enterprise is located. Presently, however, only the interests of the share-
holders and the employees are represented on the board of the German
corporation. These two groups must bargain out, in good faith, appropriate
corporate decisions. Except in an unusual case where the decision is specifi-
cally articulated as being for the sole benefit of one interest to the detriment of
the other interests, it would appear that the business judgments of a German
board will not be second-guessed by the courts.
A significant difference between the German system and the U.S. system is
that in Germany both the interests of shareholders and the interests of
employees are represented on the board of directors. It seems to me that the
presence of a nonshareholder constituency on the board gives that group a
greater opportunity to affect corporate decisions.
Originally, corporate ownership and control were closely linked. But the rise
of the large, publicly held corporation has resulted in the divorce of ownership
from control. In dealing with this development, modern corporation lav
attempts to provide mechanisms which ensure that management does its job
efficiently and loyally. In other words, it attempts to make management
accountable. I would like to focus briefly on a number of traditional mecha-
nisms for making management accountable.
One such mechanism is the opportunity to displace management, to periodi-
cally review management's stewardship, and to vote, whether directly or
indirectly, on whether to retain management. The effectiveness of this mecha-
nism depends to some extent on full and fair disclosure of management
performance. It also depends on an adequate opportunity for casting a vote,
which implies some kind of proxy system [4]. Another avenue for determining
whether or not to retain management is through market action, particularly the
hostile tender offer [5].
A second form of control is the articulation of normative standards of
conduct - e.g. the duty of care and the duty of loyalty - with appropriate
mechanisms for enforcing adherence to those standards of conduct. Ap-
propriate mechanisms of enforcement in the United States include both
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol6/iss3/2
Session One: Role of the board of directors
criminal sanctions (such as the penalties for embezzlement [6] and insider
trading [7]) and civil remedies (such as damages for harm to the corporation
caused by failure to observe the articulated norms) [8]. In the United States,
criminal violations may be prosecuted by a government agency such as the
Department of Justice. Civil remedies may be enforced by a government
agency such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), or by private
suits, both derivative and class actions.
A third method of enforcing accountability is the disclosure obligations
which are designed to inform both voting shareholders and the market [9].
Disclosure, however, also has a very direct impact on corporate conduct. Many
years ago Justice Brandeis characterized sunlight as the best disinfectant [10]:
people are often prepared to forgo certain activities if they must disclose those
activities to the public. I imagine that all of us who have counselled corporate
clients that a particular transaction must be disclosed have gotten the reaction:
"Well, in that case, let us not do the transaction."
Each of these three approaches (and others which I do not have time to
discuss) to assure accountability has defects. For example, management con-
trols the proxy machinery, including formulation of the issues to be presented,
and a widely scattered shareholder body normally has neither the interest nor
incentive to monitor management carefully or undertake the expense of
organizing shareholders to act together to oppose management. The failure of
these approaches to ensure management accountability, either alone or in
combination, has focused increasing attention on the board of directors as the
locus for providing effective monitoring of operational management [11].
Within the board, particular attention has been directed to outside directors:
those members of the board who do not have a significant relationship with the
full-time senior executives of the corporation.
Under U.S. law, the business and affairs of the corporation are managed
under the direction of the board [12]. The formulation "under the direction of
the board" recognizes that boards of directors generally do not actively
manage publicly held corporations. Rather, the task of day-to-day manage-
ment is confined to the senior executives chosen by the board. The board
generally acts as a unit, although functions are often delegated to committees
[13]. Each member of the board has power and status equal to that of any
other member of the board, although as a practical matter the chairman
typically has special power to call meetings, set the agenda, and appoint
committees. The typical U.S. board consists of some senior executives of the
corporation, several advisers to the corporation (perhaps one of the corpora-
tion's outside counsel or investment banker), and some other members who
have no other significant relationship with the senior executives of the corpora-
tion. It is the last category, the outside directors, upon which the monitoring
concept focuses.
Monitoring by the board, and particularly by the outside directors, has at
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least two advantages over other techniques. First, communication of informa-
tion can be tailored to meet the needs of the individual board members. Board
members can ask very specific questions and obtain answers responsive to
those questions. This is very different from, for example, the generalized set of
disclosures, responsive to all of the shareholders' questions that one finds in a
proxy statement [14]. Second, board responses to management shortcomings
can be tailored to the specific situation. The board can fire particular manage-
ment, can decide not to give raises or to give lower raises, or can provide
incentives for management to carry out actions deemed necessary. These
flexible responses cannot be developed as easily under the other mechanisms I
have talked about.
Casting the board in a monitoring role is consistent with the overall
structure and functioning of the corporation. Businesses maintain internal
controls with respect to operations and finances. These controls converge at
the office of the chief executive. This is the level at which a need for
independent monitoring arises. While management is normally in the best
position to exercise business judgement about the company's affairs, there are
situations when its judgement may be tainted by personal interest. A means for
correcting this situation may be afforded by bringing the conflict to the
attention of the independent, outside directors. In other cases, management's
judgment will be unreliable because it has psychologically committed itself to a
certain course of action. A critical review of this course of action by a group of
outside directors is a useful corrective device. Also, as a general matter, a
careful review of management's business judgment is desirable whenever
proposed action can be expected to have a significant impact on the corpora-
tion.
Monitoring is essentially a reviev of management's judgment. The outside
directors are not expected to substitute their own views for those of manage-
ment. Monitoring does not contemplate a hostile or adverse attitude toward
management; rather, it requires that the outside directors be alert and that they
be prepared to raise questions.
At this point I would like to discuss some techniques for monitoring. The
likelihood of a board successfully implementing the monitoring concept de-
pends primarily on the ability to create an environment supportive of monitor-
ing. There are a number of elements involved in creating this kind of
supportive environment.
The first element is a critical mass of outside directors. The essential factor
here is to have a sufficient number of outside directors so that they can discuss
among themselves the various areas of concern" and explore remedial actions.
Various proposals have suggested different numbers of outside directors. A few
years ago, Professor Leech and I suggested that a board of directors have at
least three outside directors, depending on the work to be done [15]. In a more
radical proposal, one which has not been adopted by many U.S. corporations,
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former SEC Chairman Harold Williams called for a board of directors
comprised of all outsiders, with the exception of the chief executive officer.
Presently, the ALI draft calls for a majority of outside directors [16].
This need for discussion defines the second step in creating a hospitable
environment for monitoring: routine occasions for some or all of the outside
directors to meet together without the intervention of inside directors. Meet-
ings of the audit committee, for example (which is typically composed only of
outside directors), offer a routine occasion for discussion among the outside
directors.
The third element is the method of selecting outside directors. In the United
States, outside directors are often nominated by a committee of outside
directors. The ALI draft recommends that no officers or employees sit on the
nominating committee and that a majority of those on the nominating commit-
tee have no significant relationships with senior executives [17]. The point here
is that outside directors should not feel that they owe their selection to
management.
The fourth element is that the outside directors and management should
agree on the role of the outside directors. Without this mutual understanding,
tension and hostility may prevail, which will diminish the efficiency of moni-
toring.
The fifth element is that management must ensure that outside directors
receive an adequate flow of information in a form which indicates problems
and alternative solutions. The outside directors must be provided with this
information in a timely manner so that they may reflect on this information
and develop a feel for the problems presented. As a corollary, the outside
directors must have access to professional staff which will provide them with
additional information and help the directors to understand the information
transmitted. By "professional staff" I do not mean to imply that the directors
must have a staff, inside or outside the corporation, assigned to them.
Typically, directors can rely on the staff work provided by management. Of
course, there may be occasions when separate professional help is necessary. In
reviewing derivative litigation brought against management, the responsible
committee of outside directors often retains separate counsel to advise it.
Finally, the outside directors' level of compensation should signify that the
role of the outside director is significant and that a substantial time commit-
ment and effort is required to fulfill that role adequately.
Please note that nowhere in my list have I suggested the need to split the
outside directors off from the other directors in a way which would further
emphasize their special responsibilities. The U.S. board functions as a unit,
with each director's power and status equal to those of every other director.
Creating a formal split in the board along the lines of the German board would
be a sharp departure from current U.S. practice.
At this point, I would like to ask my colleague Fritz Kiibler to comment on
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
Session One: Role of the board of directors
some of the issues which I have raised from the context of the German
corporation.
Professor Kiabler:
I have two observations relating to Dean Mundheim's comments. The first
concerns the goal of commercial and business activity. Classical doctrine
requires that the directors pursue the interests of the business corporation.
More and more countries, such as Germany, Japan, and Switzerland, have
broadened the definition of the corporation's objectives to include not only the
interests of the shareholders but also those of the employees.
In Germany, this broadened definition of the corporation's interests was
challenged on constitutional grounds. The Constitutional Court concluded that
co-determination, that is, the participation of employees in the management of
the corporation, is not an uncompensated taking of the shareholders' property
rights. So long as promotion of employee interests is a proper goal of
management activities, worker participation in the decision-making process is
permissible [18].
My second observation concerns the supervisory board, which is a tradi-
tional element of the German corporation. These boards have been satisfactory
in ensuring that managers meet their fiduciary responsibilities. No violations of
these responsibilities appear in court decisions, at least with respect to large,
publicly owned business corporations. This phenomenon can be easily ex-
plained. The corporation's supervisory board comprises mostly managers of
other large German corporations. These people have a common interest in
avoiding scandals which might cast doubt on existing corporation law, which is
frequently quite favorable to management. Thus, the managers have developed
a kind of professional morality that is generally respected. I believe that a
similar situation exists in other European countries.
Professor Mercadal:
Thank you, Professor Kibler. Mr. Peaucelle will now discuss some of the
practical problems encountered in the management and oversight of a French
corporation.
Mr. Peaucelle:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to examine the role of
the board of directors, the manner in which the board fulfills that role, and the
growing gap between the economic responsibilities and social responsibilities
of the board. I know that you are all familiar with French corporation law, but
I would remind you that French law calls for a management board, presided
over by a President, Director General (PDG). The law, in theory, gives the
same powers to the board as to the PDG.
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In France, the board may manage or it may supervise. The Civil Code does
not precisely define the respective powers of the board of directors, the PDG,
and the deputy directors (who also may participate in the decision-making
process). Because the law is unclear, a number of other factors determine
whether the board manages or supervises. These factors include the articles of
the corporation, which may limit the powers of the board or the PDG; the
financial structure of the corporation; the traditions and history of the corpo-
ration; and the unwritten conventions governing the relationship between the
shareholders and the board of directors. The sum of these competing in-
fluences will determine the role of the board.
Now let us consider the actual functioning of a French board of directors.
The most important factor here is the size and financial structure of the
corporation. If, for example, the business is owned and operated by an
individual or a family, then a single person will make the decisions. He will, of
course, ask his board of directors for advice, and he will probably have as
directors people whose advice he values. But the final decision will be made by
the controlling individual. This type of business structure is becoming increas-
ingly outmoded in France.
A slightly different situation exists when the firm has a small number of
stockholders. In this type of corporation there is a great need for consensus
among the stockholders. Consequently, the role of the board is minimized since
important decisions will be made by the directors after consultation with the
stockholders.
This leads us to the large, publicly held corporation in which no single
stockholder is controlling. In such a corporation, the co-optation system often
permits the chairman to exercise tremendous influence over the board. The
absence of a controlling shareholder frequently allows the chairman to play a
decisive role in the co-opting of new directors. This power allows the chairman
to shape the policies of the board, frequently limiting the board to rubber-
stamping management's decisions.
Another category of corporation, the one I know best, is where at least 35%
of the stock is held by a financial group or consortium. If the parent group
controls a number of companies, monitoring duties will be split between the
holding company's board and the subsidiary's board. In practice, either the
management of the parent group or the managers of the different affiliates will
jointly adopt a structure and strategic plan for the entire group. Actual
monitoring of the planning process occurs at the holding company level: the
parent's board ensures that decisions are made only after serious study and
that the majority stockholder's interest is protected. The subsidiary's board is
limited to a supervisory role - guaranteeing that the objectives of the sub-
sidiary corporation are being pursued, that management is operating in an
efficient and competent fashion, and that the law is obeyed. The subsidiary's
board, in effect, monitors the interests of the subsidiary's minority stock-
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holders. Although this division of labor was not contemplated by the legis-
lature, the combined review by the parent and subsidary's boards does protect
all interested parties.
The growing presence of large corporations in France has led us away from
management by the individual to the more modern management by the group.
Legislation, such as the 1966 statute, has constrained the actions of the board
chairman. Consumers and government regulators, such as the Commission des
Operations de Bourse, have demanded the disclosure of more and more
information. These developments have forced the chairman to be a more
respectful of the board. On economic questions, the chairman increasingly
must defer to the board.
At the same time, French law makes the chairman solely responsible for
matters pertaining to social issues. Labor negotiations, hiring and firing, and
other matters are examples of social issues for which the chairman is responsi-
ble. This creates a problem in priorities: who should set policy for the
corporation, the board or the chairman? Should the chairman plan for social
questions and the board adapt its economic plans accordingly? Or should the
reverse occur? The answer to these questions will, in large part, determine what
role the board plays in managing the corporation, and how the board fulfills
that role.
Professor Mercadal:
Thank you Mr. Peaucelle. Let me now give the floor to Mr. Mathey, who
will describe his experience with a French company which has shifted from the
traditional business corporation structure to a directorate and a supervisory
board.
Mr. Mathey:
Thank you. Let me start by describing our company. CEDIS is a business
corporation with a number of affiliates, having its headquarters in Besanqon.
At present we sell about 50000 different food and nonfood products. Except
for the bottling of wines, we are purely a retail company and do no manufac-
turing. We have 8500 employees and 866 supermarkets with total selling area
of 221000 square meters. The company was created in 1965 by the merger of
four regional companies with an equity of 90 million francs. In 1977, CEDIS
purchased as 93% interest in a fifth company.
I was Chairman of the Board of CEDIS from its inception in 1965 to my
retirement in 1982. The board of directors consisted of myself and a number of
directors from the original four companies. When the board members began to
retire, we decided to give the management of CEDIS to a much younger team.
In light of recent changes in the law and current trends in management, the
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board chose to adopt the structure of a supervisory board and a directorate.
The old directors became members of the supervisory board. The directorate
has five members and two deputy directors.
In our particular case, use of the directorate structuring allowed us to
include two senior staff members with no equity in the company in the
decision-making group. These were young, skilled people responsible in part
for the success of the company. They are officially at the policy-making level.
Before changing the management structure, we studied the 1966 statute and
the 1967 decree. Because the law did not precisely define the roles of the
supervisory board and the directorate, we referred to the law on the board of
directors. While the responsibilities of each member of the board of directors
are specified by statute, the roles of the supervisory board members and the
directorate are only vaguely defined. We chose to abolish the hierarchy of the
usual board in favor of collective management by the directorate. Currently,
decisions must be approved by a majority of the directorate; the chairman can
be in the minority. The absence of formal structure is offset by an allotment of
duties (unenforceable by third parties) among the directorate's members.
Before the reorganization, the chairman and two executive directors controlled
the major departments of the corporation. This division of power still exists,
notwithstanding the fact that it violates the principle of equality of power
among the directorate members. All members of the directorate are protected
by working contracts allocated on the basis of their functions.
Originally, we had wanted to carefully define the relationship between the
directorate and the supervisory board. We decided to eschew this approach,
however, because we were afraid to create too rigid a framework. The one
requirement which was placed in the corporation's Articles of Association was
that the directorate must submit to the supervisory board a draft budget for
the upcoming fiscal year and obtain the board's approval. In our company, this
budgetary process is extremely important as it specifies, inter alia, the financ-
ing of the company, staffing requirements for the upcoming year, operating
costs, margins and new investments. The supervisory board also has the
authority to monitor the implementation of the budget and receive quarterly
and annual reports concerning the company's accounts. Finally, the super-
visory board (in addition to the directorate) has the power to convene the
general assembly.
We have found our system satisfactory. I want to emphasize the need for a
good working relationship between the chairman and the other members of the
directorate. Without such cooperation the corporation will falter - no single
individual can make the decisions necessary for the corporation's continued
operation.
The legal status of the CEDIS structure is still unclear. There are a number
of gaps in the existing law. The legislature has not properly evaluated the
problems and malfunctions that are likely to arise in the operation of the new
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corporation. The vagueness of the statutes probably underlies the reluctance of
many companies to adopt the new system of management.
Professor Mercadal:
Thank you very much, Mr. Mathey. The floor is now open to questions.
From the floor:
Can a useful comparison be made between the directorate and supervising
board in France and the presence of outside directors on the U.S. board?
Mr. Mathey:
It is tempting to draw a parallel here, but the situations are quite dissimilar.
In the United States, the outside directors are full participants on the board,
with a special responsibility for oversight. The French case is just the opposite.
Members of the directorate and supervisory board are insiders who are directly
or indirectly linked to the capital and/or management of the company.
From the floor:
What are the implications of this distinction?
Mr. Mathey:
Personally, I would say that the French system of co-opting directors
hinders progress of the type seen in the United States. I think we need changes
in both legislation and attitudes. Such a change has begun without new
legislation. More and more chairmen believe that two-thirds of the board of
directors should be people who are very much involved with the functioning of
the company and one-third should be outsiders. These outsiders would serve as
the "moral bulwark" of the company.
Mr. Peaucelle:
I have one more comment to make. In the United States, there appears to be
a consensus of opinion among legislators, the public, business leaders, and
company employees on the basic goal and form of the corporation. This
consensus simply does not exist in France. This difference may explain the
different trends and solutions which have emerged in France to meet the
problems of the corporation.
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Dean Mundheimn:
I would like to provide a little background on the expansion of the role of
the outside director in the U.S. corporate scene. The development is relatively
recent. Less than fifteen yars ago, Miles Mace, a professor at Harvard Business
School, examined the board of directors in a book entitled Myth and Reality
[19]. The "myth" was that directors acted independently and assumed respon-
sible roles. The "reality" was that they rubber-stamped management's deci-
sions. At about the same time a number of events caused great concern among
the public. For example, the Penn Central Corporation, which had always been
perceived as a reliable company, went bankrupt. The Securities and Exchange
Commission report revealed that the board had done nothing to halt the slide
toward bankruptcy [20]. Concurrently, it was discovered that U.S. corporations
were making illegal or questionable payments both in the United States and
abroad to further corporate objectives. A number of other problems in the
areas of environmental protection and occupational safety also surfaced in this
period.
As the public grew more concerned, corporations began to fear legislation
and took steps to change the attitude and role of the outside director. Thus,
public pressure and not legislation was the catalyst that effected change. As I
understand it, the French situation at the present time is somewhat analogous.
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Notes
[1i Restatement of Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure, section 2.01 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1982).
[2] Id. The full text of section 2.01 is set out here for future reference.
§2.01. Corporate law should provide that the objective of the business corporation is to conduct
business activities with a view to corporate profit and shareholder gain, except that, even if
corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of
its business:
(a) is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law,
(b) may properly take into account ethical principles that are generally recognized as relevant
to the conduct of business, and
(c) may devote resources, within reasonable limits, to public welfare, humanitarian, educa-
tional, and philanthropic purposes.
[3] See Sylvia Martin Foundation, Inc. v. Swearingen, 260 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
[4] A proxy system permits the shareholder to exercise his voting rights through an agent. The
term "proxy" may refer either to the agent or to the ballot cast by the agent. Companies subject to
the reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act") must comply
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